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The research project on Systems Analysis of Technological and Economic Dynamics at  IIASA is 
concerned with modeling technological and organisational change; the broader economic devel- 
opments that  are associated with technological change, both as cause and effect; the processes 
by which economic agents - first of all, business firms - acquire and develop the capabilities 
to  generate, imitate and adopt technological and organisational innovations; and the aggregate 
dynamics - a t  the levels of single industries and whole economies - engendered by the interac- 
tions among agents which are heterogeneous in their innovative abilities, behavioural rules and 
expectations. The central purpose is to develop stronger theory and better modeling techniques. 
However, the basic philosophy is that such theoretical and modeling work is most fruitful when 
attention is paid t o  the known empirical details of the phenomena the work aims to  address: 
therefore, a considerable effort is put into a better understanding of the 'stylized facts7 concern- 
ing corporate organisation routines and strategy; industrial evolution and the 'demography7 of 
firms; patterns of macroeconomic growth and trade. 
From a modeling perspective, over the last decade considerable progress has been made on 
various techniques of dynamic modeling. Some of this work has employed ordinary differential 
and difference equations, and some of it stochastic equations. A number of efforts have taken 
advantage of the growing power of simulation techniques. Others have employed more traditional 
mathematics. As a result of this theoretical work, the toolkit for modeling technological and 
economic dynamics is significantly richer than it was a decade ago. 
During the same period, there have been major advances in the empirical understanding. 
There are now many more detailed technological histories available. Much more is known about 
the similarities and differences of technical advance in different fields and industries and there is 
some understanding of the key variables that  lie behind those differences. A number of studies 
have provided rich information about how industry structure co-evolves with technology. In 
addition to  empirical work a t  the technology or sector level, the last decade has also seen a 
great deal of empirical research on productivity growth and measured technical advance a t  the 
level of whole economies. A considerable body of empirical research now exists on the facts that  
seem associated with different rates of productivity growth across the range of nations, with the 
dynamics of convergence and divergence in the levels and rates of growth of income, with the 
diverse national institutional arrangements in which technological change is embedded. 
As a result of this recent empirical work, the questions that successful theory and useful 
modeling techniques ought t o  address now are much more clearly defined. The theoretical work 
has often been undertaken in appreciation of certain stylized facts that  needed to  be explained. 
The list of these 'facts7 is indeed very long, ranging from the microeconomic evidence concerning 
for example dynamic increasing returns in learning activities or the persistence of particular sets 
of problem-solving routines within business firms; the industry-level evidence on entry, exit and 
size-distributions - approximately log-normal- all the way to  the evidence regarding the time- 
series properties of major economic aggregates. However, the connection between the theoretical 
work and the empirical phenomena has so far not been very close. The philosophy of this project 
is that  the chances of developing powerful new theory and useful new analytical techniques can 
be greatly enhanced by performing the work in an environment where scholars who understand 
the empirical phenomena provide questions and challenges for the theorists and their work. 
In particular, the project is meant t o  pursue an 'evolutionary7 interpretation of technological 
and economic dynamics modeling, first, the processes by which individual agents and organisa- 
tions learn, search, adapt; second, the economic analogues of 'natural selection7 by which inter- 
active environments - often markets - winnow out a population whose members have different 
attributes and behavioural traits; and, third, the collective emergence of statistical patterns, 
regularities and higher-level structures as the aggregate outcomes of the two former processes. 
Together with a group of researchers located permanently a t  IIASA, the project coordinates 
multiple research efforts undertaken in several institutions around the world, organises workshops 
and provides a venue of scientific discussion among scholars working on evolutionary modeling, 
computer simulation and non-linear dynamical systems. 
The research focuses upon the following three major areas: 
1. Learning Processes and Organisational Competence. 
2. Technological and Industrial Dynamics 
3. Innovation, Competition and Macrodynamics 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The global competitive battles in high technology industries such as 
semiconductors, information services, and software have demonstrated the need for 
an expanded paradigm to understand how competitive advantage is gained and 
held. Well-known companies like IBM, Texas Instruments, Phillips, and others 
appear to have followed a "resource-based strategy" of accumulating valuable 
technology assets, often guarded by an aggressive intellectual property stance. 
However, this strategy is often not enough to support a significant competitive 
advantage. Winners in the global marketplace have been firms that can demonstrate 
timely responsiveness and rapid and flexible product innovation, coupled with the 
management capability to effectively coordinate and redeploy internal and external 
competences. Not surprisingly, industry observers have remarked that companies 
can accumulate a large stock of valuable technology assets and still not have many 
useful capabilities. 
We refer to this source of competitive advantage as "dynamic capabilities" to 
emphasize two key aspects which were not the main focus of attention in previous 
strategy perspectives. The term "dynamic" refers to the shifting character of the 
environment; certain strategic responses are required when time-to-market and 
timing is critical, the pace of innovation accelerating, and the nature of future 
competition and markets difficult to determine. The term "capabilities" emphasizes 
the key role of strategic management in appropriately adapting, integrating, and re- 
configuring internal and external organizational skills, resources, and functional 
competences toward changing environment. 
The notion that competitive advantage requires both the exploitation of 
existing internal and external firm-specific capabilities and of developing new ones is 
partially developed in Penrose (1959), Teece (1982), and Wernerfelt (1984). However, 
only recently have researchers begun to focus on the specifics of how some 
organizations first develop firm-specific capabilities and how they renew 
competences to respond to shifts in the business environment.' These issues are 
intimately tied to the firm's business processes, market positions, and expansion 
paths. Several writers have recently offered insights and evidence on how firms can 
develop their capability to adapt and even capitalize on rapidly changing 
environments.2 The dynamic capabilities approach provides a coherent framework 
which can both integrate existing conceptual and empirical knowledge, and facilitate 
prescription. In doing so, it builds upon the theoretical foundations provided by 
Schumpeter (1934), Penrose (1959), Williamson (1975, 1985), Barney (1986), Nelson 
and Winter (1982), and Teece (1988), and Teece et al. (1994). 
11. TOWARD A DYNAMIC CAPABILITIES FRAMEWORK 
11.1 Markets and Strategic Capabilities 
Different approaches to strategy view sources of wealth creation and the 
essence of the strategic problem faced by firms differently. The competitive forces 
framework sees the strategic problem in terms of market entry, entry deterrence, and 
positioning; game-theoretic models view the strategic problem as one of interaction 
between rivals with certain expectations about how each other will behave;3 
resource-based perspectives have focused on the exploitation of firm-specific assets. 
Each approach asks different, often complementary questions. A key step in 
building a conceptual framework related to dynamic capabilities is to identify the 
foundations upon which distinctive and difficult to replicate advantages can be built. 
A useful way to vector in on the strategic elements of the business enterprise 
is to first identify what isn't strategic. To be strategic, a capability must be honed to a 
1 See, for example, Iansiti and Clark (1994), and R. Henderson (1994). 
See Hayes, Wheelwright and Clark (1988), Prahalad and Hamel (1990), Direrickx and Cool (19891, 
Chandler (1990), and Teece (1993). 
In sequential move games, each player looks ahead and anticipates his rivals future responses in 
order to reason back and decide action, i.e., look forward, reason backward. 
user need (so that there are customers), unique (so that the products/services 
produced can be priced without too much regard to competition) and difficult to 
replicate (so profits won't be competed away). Accordingly, any assets or entity 
which is homogeneous and can be bought and sold at an established price cannot be 
all that strategic (Barney, 1986). What is it, then, about firms which undergirds 
competitive advantage? 
To answer this, one must first make some fundamental distinctions between 
markets and internal organization (firms). The essence of the firm, as Coase (1937) 
pointed out, is that it displaces market organization. It does so in the main because 
inside the firms one can organize certain types of economic activity in ways one 
cannot using markets. This is not only because of transaction costs, as Williamson 
(1975,1985) as emphasized, but also because there are many types of arrangements 
where injecting high powered (market like) incentives might well be quite 
destructive of the cooperative activity and learning. Indeed, the essence of internaI 
organization is that it is a domain of unleveraged or low-powered incentives. By 
unleveraged we mean that rewards are determined at the group or organization 
level, not primarily at the individual level, in an effort to encourage team behavior, 
not individual behavior, in order to accomplish certain tasks well. Inside an 
organization, exchange cannot take place in the same manner that it can outside an 
organization, not just because it might be destructive to provide high powered 
individual incentives, but because it is difficult if not impossible to tightly calibrate 
individual contribution to a joint effort. Hence, contrary to Arrows (1969) view of 
firms as quasi markets, and the task of management to inject markets into firms, we 
recognize the inherent limits and possible counterproductive results of attempting to 
fashion firms into clusters of internal markets. In particular, learning and internal 
technology transfer may well be jeopardized. 
Indeed, what is distinctive about firms is that they are domains for organizing 
activity in a non market like fashion. According, as we discuss what is distinctive 
about firms, we stress competences/capabilities which are ways of organizing and 
getting things done which cannot be accomplished by using the price system to 
coordinate activity. The very essence of capabilities/ competences is that they cannot 
be readily assembled through markets (Teece, 1982, 1986a; Kogut and Zander, 1992). 
If the ability to assemble competences using markets is what is meant by the firm as a 
nexus of contracts (Fama, 1980), then we unequivocally state that the firm about 
which we theorize cannot be usefully modeled as a nexus of contracts. By contract 
we are referring to a transaction.undergirded by a legal agreement, or some other 
arrangement which clearly spells out rights, rewards, and responsibilities. Moreover, 
the finn as a nexus of contracts suggests a series of bilateral contracts orchestrated by 
a coordinator, where our view of the firm is that the organization takes place in a 
more multilateral fashion, with patterns of behavior and learning being orchestrated 
in a much more decentralized fashion. 
The key point, however, is that the properties of internal organization cannot 
be replicated by a portfolio of business units amalgamated through formal contracts 
as the distinctive elements of internal organization simply cannot be replicated in the 
market.4 That is, entrepreneurial activity cannot lead to the immediate replication of 
unique organizational skills through simply entering a market and piecing the parts 
together overnight. Replication takes time, and the replication of best practice may 
be illusive. Indeed, firm capabilities need to be understood not in terms of balance 
sheet items, but mainly in terms of the organizational structures and managerial 
processes which support productive activity. By construction, the firm's balance 
sheet contains items that can be valued, at least at original market prices (cost). It is 
As we note in Teece et al. (19941, the conglomerate offers few if any efficiencies because there is little 
provided by the conglomerate form that shareholders cannot obtain for themselves simply by holding 
a diversified portfolio of stocks. 
necessarily the case, therefore, that the balance sheet is a poor shadow of a firm's 
distinctive ~om~etence.5  That which is distinctive cannot be bought and sold short 
of buying the firm itself, or one or more of its subunits. 
There are many dimensions to the business firm that must be understood if 
one is to grasp firm-level distinctive competences/capabilities. In this paper we 
merely identify several classes of factors that will help determine a firm's dynamic 
capabilities. We organize these in three categories: processes, positions, and paths. 
11.2. Processes, Positions, and Paths 
We advance the argument that the strategic dimensions of the firm are its 
managerial and organizational processes, its present position, and the paths avaiIable 
to it. By managerial and organizational processes, we refer to the way things are 
done in the firm, or what might be referred to as its routines, or patterns of current 
practice and learning. By position we refer to its current endowment of technology 
and intellectual property, as well as its customer base and upstream relations with 
suppliers.6 By paths we refer to the strategic alternatives available to the firm, and 
the attractiveness of the opportunities which lie ahead. Our focus throughout is on 
asset structures for which no ready market exits, as these are the only assets of 
strategic interest. A final section focuses on replication and imitation, as it is these 
phenomena which determine how readily a competence or capability can be cloned 
by competitors, and therefore the durability of its advantage. 
The firms' processes and positions collectively encompass its capabilities or 
competences. A hierarchy of competences/capabilities ought be recognized, as some 
competences may be on the factory floor, some in the R&D labs, some in the 
5 Owners' equity may reflect, in part, certain historic capabilities. Recently, some scholars have begun 
to attempt to measure organizational capability using financial statement data. See Baldwin and Clark 
(1991) and Lev and Sougiannis (1992). 
We also recognize its strategic alliances with competitors. 
executive suites, and so-me in the way everything is integrated. A difficult to 
replicate or difficult to imitate competence/capability can be considered a distinctive 
competence. As indicated, the key feature of distinctive competences and 
capabilities is that there is not a market for them, except possibly through the market 
for business units7 or corporate control. Hence competences and capabilities are 
intriguing assets as they typically must be built because they cannot be bought. 
Dynamic capabilities are the subset of the competences/capabilities which allow the 
firm to create new products and processes, and respond to changing market 
circumstances. 
II.2.a. Organizational and Managerial Processes 
Integration: While the price system supposedly coordinates the economy, 
managers coordinate or integrate activity inside the firm. How efficiently and 
effectively internal coordination or integration is achieved is very important (Aoki, 
1990).* Likewise for external coordination.9 Increasingly, strategic advantage 
requires the integration of external activities and technologies. The growing 
literature on strategic alliances, the virtual corporation, and buyer-supplier relations 
and technology collaboration evidences the importance of external integration and 
sourcing. 
There is some field-based empirical research that provides support for the 
notion that the way production is organized by management inside the firm is the 
Such competences may unravel if the subunit is separated from the parent. 
8 Indeed, Ronald Coase, author of the pathbreaking 1937 article "The Nature of the Firm," which 
focused on the costs of organizational coordination inside the firm as compared to across the market, 
half a century later has identified as critical the understanding of "why the costs of organizing 
particular activities differs among firms" (Coase 1988: 47). We argue that a firm's distinctive ability 
needs to be understood as a reflection of distinctive organizational or coordinative capabilities. This 
form of integration (i.e. inside business units) is different from the integration between business units; 
they could be viable on a stand-alone basis (external integration). For a useful taxonomy, see Iansiti 
and Clark, op. cit. (1994). 
Amy Shuen (1994) examines the gains and hazards of the technology make vs. buy decision and 
supplier co-development. 
source of differences in firms' competence in various domains. For example, Garvin's 
(1988) study of 18 room air conditioning plants reveals that quality performance was 
not related to either capital investment or the degree of automation of the facilities. 
Instead, quality performance was driven by special organizational routines. These 
included routines for gathering and processing information, for linking customer 
experiences with engineering design choices, and for coordinating factories and 
component s ~ ~ ~ l i e r s . ~ 0  The work of Clark and Fujimoto (1991) on project 
development in the automobile industry also illustrates the role played by 
coordinative routines. Their study reveals a significant degree of variation in how 
different firms coordinate the various activities required to bring a new model from 
concept to market. These differences in coordinative routines and capabilities seem 
to have a significant impact on such performance variables as development cost, 
development lead times, and quality. Furthermore, they tended to find significant 
firm-level differences in coordination routines and these differences seemed to have 
persisted for a long time. This suggests that routines related to coordination are 
firm-specific in nature. 
Also, the notion that competence/capability is embedded in distinct ways of 
coordinating and combining helps to explain how and why seemingly minor 
technological changes can have devastating impacts on incumbent firms' abilities to 
compete in a market. Henderson and Clark (1990), for example, have shown that 
incumbents in the photolithographic equipment industry were sequentially 
devastated by seemingly minor innovations that, nevertheless, had major impacts on 
how systems had to be configured. They attribute these difficulties to the fact that 
systems level or "architectural" innovations often require new routines to integrate 
and coordinate engineering tasks. These findings and others suggest that productive 
systems display high interdependency, and that it may not be possible to change one 
10 Gamin (1994) provides a typology of organizational processes. 
level without changing others. This appears to be true with respect to the "lean 
production" model (Womack et al.) which has now transformed the Taylor or Ford 
model of manufacturing organization in the automobile industry.ll Lean production 
requires distinctive shop floor practices and processes as well as distinctive higher 
order managerial processes. Put differently, organizational processes often display 
high levels of coherence, and when they do, replication may be difficult because it 
requires systemic changes throughout the organization and also among 
interorganizational linkages which might be very hard to effectuate. Put differently, 
partial imitation or replication of a successful model may yield zero benefits. 
The notion that there is a certain rationality or coherence to processes and 
systems is not quite the same concept as corporate culture, as we understand the 
11 Fujimoto (1994, pp. 18-20) describes key elements as they existed in the Japanese auto industry as 
follows: "The typical volume production system of effective Japanese makers of the 1980s (e.g., 
Toyota) consists of various intertwined elements that might lead to competitive advantages. Just-in- 
Time (JIT), Jidoka) (automatic defect detection and machine stop), Total Quality Control (TQC), and 
continuous improvement (Kaizen) are often pointed out as its core subsystems. The elements of such 
a system include inventory reduction mechanisms by Kanban system; levelization of production 
volume and product mix (heijunka); Reduction of "muda" (non-value adding activities), "mura" 
(uneven pace of production) and muri (excessive workload); production plans based on dealers' order 
volume (genyo seisan); reduction of die set-up time and lot size in stamping operation; mixed model 
assembly; piece-by-piece transfer of parts between machines (ikko-nagashi); flexible task assignment 
for volume changes and productivity improvement (shojinka); multi-task job assignment along the 
process flow (takotei-mochi); U-shape machine layout that facilitates flexible and multiple task 
assignment, on-the-spot inspection by direct workers (tsukurikomi); fool-proof prevention of defects 
(poka-yoke); real-time feedback of production troubles (andon); assembly line stop cord; emphasis on 
cleanliness; order, and discipline on the shop floor (5-5); frequent revision of standard operating 
procedures by supervisors; quality control circles; standardized tools for quality improvement (e.g., 7 
tools for QC, QC story); worker involvement in preventive maintenance (Total Productive 
Maintenance); low cost automation or semi-automation with just-enough functions); reduction of 
process steps for saving of tools and dies, and so on. The human-resource management factors that 
back up the above elements include stable employment of core workers (with temporary workers in 
the periphery); long-term training of multi-skilled (multi-task) workers; wage system based in part on 
skill accumulation; internal promotion to shop floor supervisors; cooperative relationships with labor 
unions; inclusion of production supervisors in union members; generally egalitarian policies for 
corporate welfare, communication and worker motivation. Parts procurement policies are also 
pointed out often as a source of the competitive advantage; relatively high ratio of parts out-sourcing; 
multi-layer hierarchy of suppliers; long-term relations with suppliers; relatively small number of 
technologically capable suppliers at the first tier; subassembly functions of the first-tier parts makers; 
detail-engineering capability of the first tier makers (design-in, back box parts); competition based on 
long-term capability of design and improvements rather than bidding; pressures for continuous 
reduction of parts price; elimination of incoming parts inspection; plant inspection and technical 
assistance by auto makers, and so on." 
latter. Corporate culture refers to the values and beliefs that employees hold; culture 
can be a de facto governance system as it mediates the behavior of individuals and 
economizes on more formal administrative methods. Rationality or coherence 
notions are more akin to the Nelson and Winter (1982) notion of organizational 
routines. However, the routines concept is a little too amorphous to properly capture 
the congruence amongst processes and between processes and incentives that we 
have in mind. Consider a professional service organization like an accounting firm. 
If it is to have relatively high-powered incentives that reward individual 
performance, then it must build organizational processes that channel individual 
behavior; if it has weak or low-powered incentives, it must find symbolic ways to 
recognize the high performers, and it must use alternative methods to build effort 
and enthusiasm. What one may think of as styles of organization in fact contain 
necessary, not discretionary, elements to achieve performance. Recognizing the 
congruences and complementarities among processes, and between processes and 
incentives, is critical to the understanding of organizational capabilities. In 
particular, they can help us explain why architectural and radical innovations are so 
often introduced into an industry by new entrants. The incumbents develop 
distinctive organizational processes that cannot support the new technology, despite 
certain overt similarities between the old and the new. The frequent failure of 
incumbents to introduce new technologies can thus be seen as a consequence of the 
mismatch that so often exists between the set of organizational processes needed to 
support the conventional product/service and the requirements of the new. Radical 
organizational re-engineering will usually be required to support the new product, 
which may well do better embedded in a separate subsidiary where a new set of 
coherent organizational processes can be fashioned.12 
l2 See Abernathy and Clark, 1985. 
Learning:  Perhaps even more important than integration is learning. 
Learning is a process by which repetition and experimentation enable tasks to be 
performed better and quicker and new production opportunities to be identified.13 
In the context of the firm, if not more generally, learning has several key 
characteristics. First, learning involves organizational as well as individual skills.14 
While individual skills are of relevance, their value depends upon their employment, 
in particular organizational settings. Learning processes are intrinsically social and 
collective and occur not only through the imitation and emulation of individuals, as 
with teacher-student or master-apprentice, but also because of joint contributions to 
the understanding of complex problems. Learning requires common codes of 
communication and coordinated search procedures. Second, the organizational 
knowledge generated by such activity resides in new patterns of activity, in 
"routines," or a new logic of organization. As indicated earlier, routines are patterns 
of interactions that represent successful solutions to particular problems. These 
patterns of interaction are resident in group behavior, though certain subroutines 
may be resident in individual behavior. The concept of dynamic capabilities as a 
coordinative management process opens the door to the potential for inter- 
organizational learning. Researchers (Doz and Shuen, 1989; Mody, 1990) have 
pointed out that collaborations and partnerships can be a vehicle for new 
organizational learning, helping firms to recognize dysfunctional routines, and 
preventing strategic blindspots. 
Reconfiguration and Transfornation. In rapidly changing environments, 
there is obviously value in the ability to sense the need to reconfigure the firm's asset 
structure, and to accomplish the necessary internal and external transformation 
(Amit and Schoemaker, 1992; Langlois, 1994). This requires constant surveillance of 
l3 For a useful review and contribution, see Levitt and March, 1988. 
l4 See Mahoney (1994). 
markets and technologies and the willingness to adopt best practice. In this regard, 
benchmarking is of considerable value as an organized process for accomplishing 
such ends (Camp, 1989). In dynamic environments, narcissistic organizations are 
likely to be impaired. The capacity to reconfigure and transform is itself a learned 
organizational skill. The more frequently practiced, the easier accomplished. 
Change is costly and so firms must develop processes to minimize low payoff 
change. The ability to calibrate the requirements for change and to effectuate the 
necessary adjustments would appear to depend on the ability to scan the 
environment, to evaluate markets and competitors, and to quickly accomplish 
reconfiguration and transformation ahead of competition. Decentralization and local 
autonomy assists these processes. Firms that have honed these capabilities are 
sometimes referred to as "high flex." 
II.2.b. Positions 
The strategic posture of a finn is determined not only by its learning processes 
and by the coherence of its internal and external processes and incentives, but also by 
its location at any point in time with respect to its business assets. By business assets 
we do not mean its plant and equipment unless they are specialized; rather we mean 
its difficult-to-trade knowledge assets and assets complementary to them, as well as 
its reputational and relational assets. These will determine its market share and 
profitability at any point in time. 
Technological Assets. While there is an emerging market for know-how 
(Teece, 1981), much technology does not enter it. This is either because the firm is 
unwilling to sell it15 or because of difficulties in transacting in the market for know- 
how (Teece 1980). A firm's technological assets may or may not be protected by the 
l5 Managers often evoke the "crown jewels" metaphor. That is, if the technology is released, the 
kingdom will be lost. 
standard instruments ofintellectual property law. Either way, the ownership 
protection and utilization of technological assets are clearly key differentiators 
among firms. Likewise for complementary assets. 
Complementary Assets. Technological innovations require the use of certain 
related assets to produce and deliver new products and services. Prior 
commercialization activities require and enable firms to build such 
complementarities (Teece, 1986b). Such capabilities and assets, while necessary for 
the firm's established activities, may have other uses as well. Such assets typically lie 
downstream. New products and processes either can enhance or destroy the value of 
such assets (Tushman, Newman and Romanelli 1986). Thus the development of 
computers enhanced the value of IBM's direct sales force in office products, while 
disc brakes rendered useless much of the auto industries' investment in drum brakes. 
Financial Assets. In the short run, a firm's cash position and degree of 
leverage may have strategic implications. While there is nothing more fungible than 
cash, it cannot always be raised from external markets without the dissemination of 
considerable information to potential investors. Accordingly, what a firm can do in 
short order is often a function of its balance sheet. In the longer run, that ought not 
be so, as cash flow ought be more determinative. 
Locational Assets. Geography matters too. Uniqueness in certain businesses 
can stem from locational assets which are non-tradable (e.g., positioning of a refinery 
in a certain geographic market). While real estate markets are well developed, land 
use and environmental restrictions often make locational assets non-tradable, and 
hence may be the source of difficult to replicate advantages which manifest 
themselves in lower transport costs, superior convenience, and the like. 
II.2.c. Paths 
Path Dependencies. Where a firm can go is a function of its current position 
and the paths ahead. It is of course also shaped by the path behind. In standard 
economics textbooks, firms have an infinite range of technologies from which they 
can choose and markets they can occupy. Changes in product or factor prices will be 
responded to instantaneously, with technologies moving in and out according to 
value maximization criterion. Only in the short run are irreversibilities recognized. 
Fixed costs - such as equipment and overhead - cause firms to price below fully 
amortized costs but never constrain future investment choices. "Bygones are 
bygones." Path dependencies are simply not recognized. 
The notion of path dependencies recognizes that "history matters." Bygones 
are rarely bygones, despite the predictions of rational actor theory. Thus a firm's 
previous investments and its repertoire of routines (its "history") constrains its future 
behavior. This follows because learning tends to be local. That is, opportunities for 
learning will be "close in" to previous activities and thus will be transaction and 
production specific (Teece, 1988). This is because learning is often a process of trial, 
feedback, and evaluation. If too many parameters are changed simultaneously, the 
ability of firms to conduct meaningful natural quasi experiments is attenuated. If 
many aspects of a firm's learning environment change simultaneously, the ability to 
ascertain cause-effect relationships is confounded because cognitive structures will 
not be formed and rates of learning diminish as a result. One implication is that 
many investments are much longer term than is commonly thought. 
Technological Opportunities: The concept of path dependencies can be given 
forward meaning through the consideration of an industry's technological 
opportunities. It is well recognized that how far and how fast a particular area of 
industrial activity can proceed is in part due to the technological opportunities that 
lie before it. Such opportunities are usually a lagged function of foment and 
diversity in basic science, and the rapidity with which new scientific breakthroughs 
are being made. 
However, technological opportunities may not be completely exogenous to 
industry, not only because some firms have the capacity to engage in or at least 
support basic research, but also because technological opportunities are often fed by 
innovative activity itself. Moreover, the recognition of such opportunities are 
affected by the organizational structures that link the institutions engaging in basic 
research (primarily the university) to the business enterprise. Hence, the existence of 
technological opportunities can be quite firm specific. 
Important for our purposes is the rate and direction in which relevant 
scientific frontiers are being rolled back. Firms engaging in R&D may find the path 
dead ahead closed off, though breakthroughs in related areas may be sufficiently 
close to be attractive. Likewise, if the path dead ahead is extremely attractive, there 
may be no incentive for firms to shift the allocation of resources away from 
traditional pursuits. The depth and width of technological opportunities in the 
neighborhood of a firm's prior research activities thus are likely to impact a firm's 
options with respect to both the amount and level of R&D activity that it can justify. 
In addition, a firm's past experience conditions the alternatives management is able 
to perceive. Thus, not only do firms in the same industry face "menus" with different 
costs associated with particular technological choices, they also are looking at menus 
containing different choices.l6 
11.2.d. Assessment 
The assessment of a firm's strategic capability at any point in time is presented 
here as a function of the firm's processes, positions, and paths. What it can do and 
where it can go is thus heavily constrained by the typography of its processes, 
16 This is a critical element in Nelson and Winter's (1982) view of firms and technical change. 
positions, and paths. Each component of this capability framework needs to be 
analyzed in a strategic audit. 
We submit that if one can identify each of these components and understand 
their interrelationships, one can at least predict the performance of the firm under 
various assumptions about changes in the external environment. One can also 
evaluate the richness of the menu of new opportunities from which the firm may 
select, and its likely performance in a changing environment. 
The parameters we have identified for determining performance are radically 
different from those in the standard textbook theory of the firm, and in the 
competitive forces and strategic conflict approaches to strategy.17 Moreover, the 
agency theoretic view of the firm as a nexus of contracts would put no weight on 
processes, positions, and paths. While agency approaches to the firm may recognize 
that opportunism and shirking may limit what a firm can do, they do not recognize 
the opportunities and constraints imposed by processes, positions, and paths. 
Moreover, the firm in our conceptualization is much more than the sum of its parts - 
or a team tied together by contracts.18 Indeed, to some extent individuals can be 
moved in and out of organizations and, so long as the internal processes and 
structures remain in place, performance will not necessarily be impaired. A shift in 
the environment is a far more serious threat to the firm than is the loss of key 
individuals, as individuals can be replaced more readily than organizations can be 
transformed. Furthermore, the dynamic capabilities view of the firm would suggest 
that the behavior and performance of particular firms may be quite hard to replicate, 
even if its coherence and rationality are observable. This matter and related issues 
involving replication and imitation are taken up in the section that follows. 
l7 In both the firm is still largely a black box. Certainly, little or no attention is given to processes, 
p s i  tions, and paths. 
l8 See Alchian and Demsetz, 1972. 
11.3. Replicability and Imitatability of Organizational Processes and Positions 
Thus far, we have argued that the capabilities of a firm rests on processes, 
positions, and paths. However, distinctive organizational capabilities can provide 
competitive advantage and generate rents only if they are based on a collection of 
routines, skills, and complementary assets that are difficult to imitate.19 A particular 
set of routines can lose their value if they support a competence which no longer 
matters in the marketplace, or if they can be readily replicated or emulated by 
competitors. Imitation occurs when firms discover and simply copy a firm's 
organizational routines and procedures. Emulation occurs when firms discover 
alternative ways of achieving the same functionality. There is ample evidence that a 
given type of competence (e.g. quality) can be supported by different routines and 
combinations of skills. For example, the Garvin (1988) and Clark and Fujimoto (1990) 
studies both indicate that there was no one "formula" for achieving either high 
quality or high product development performance. 
Replication. Replication involves transferring or redeploying competences 
from one concrete economic setting to another. Since productive knowledge is 
embodied, this cannot be accomplished by simply transmitting information. Only in 
those instances where all relevant knowledge is fully codified and understood can 
replication be collapsed into a simple problem of information transfer. Too often, the 
contextual dependence of original performance is poorly appreciated, so unless firms 
have replicated their systems of productive knowledge on many prior occasions, the 
act of replication is likely to be difficult (Teece 1976). Indeed, replication and transfer 
are often impossible absent the transfer of people, though this can be minimized if 
investments are made to convert tacit knowledge to codified knowledge. Often, 
however, this is simply not possible. 
19 See Dierickx and Cool (1989) for a discussion of the characteristics of assets which make them a 
source of rents. 
In short, organizational capabilities, and the routines upon which they rest, 
are normally rather difficult to replicate.20 Even understanding what all the relevant 
routines are that support a particular competence may not be transparent. Indeed, 
Lippman and Rumelt (1992) have argued that some sources of competitive 
advantage are so complex that the firm itself, let alone its competitors, does not 
understand them.21 As Nelson and Winter (1982) and Teece (1982) have explained, 
many organizational routines are quite tacit in nature. Imitation can also be hindered 
by the fact few routines are "stand-alone"; coherence may require that a change in 
one set of routines in one part of the firm (e.g. production) requires changes in some 
other part (e.g., R&D). 
Some routines and competences seem to be attributable to local or regional 
forces that shape firms' capabilities at early stages in their lives. Porter (1990), for 
example, shows that differences in local product markets, local factor markets, and 
institutions play an important role in shaping competitive capabilities. Differences 
also exist within populations of firms from the same country. Various studies of the 
automobile industry, for example, show that not all Japanese automobile companies 
are top performers in terms of quality, productivity, or product development (see e.g. 
Clark and Fujimoto 1990). The role of firm-specific history has been highlighted as a 
critical factor explaining such firm-level (as opposed to regional or national level) 
differences (Nelson and Winter 1982). Replication in a different context may thus be 
rather difficult. 
At least two types of strategic value flow from replication. One is the ability 
to support geographic and product line expansion. To the extent that the capabilities 
20 See Gabriel Szulanski's (1993) discussion of the intra-firm transfer of best practice. He quotes a 
senior vice president of Xerox as saying "you can see a high performance factory or office, but it just 
doesn't spread. I don't know why." Szulanski also discusses the role of benchmarking in facilitating 
the transfer of best practice. 
21 If so, it is our belief that the firm's advantage is likely to fade, as luck does run out. 
in question are relevant to customer needs elsewhere, replication can confer value.22 
Another is that the ability to replicate also indicates that the firm has the foundations 
in place for learning and improvement. ConsiderabIe empirical evidence supports 
the notion that the understanding of processes, both in production and in 
management, is the key to process improvement. In short, an organization cannot 
improve that which it does not understand. Deep process understanding is often 
required to accomplish codification. Indeed, if knowledge is highly tacit, it indicates 
that underlying structures are not well understood, which limits learning because 
scientific and engineering principles cannot be as systematically applied. Instead, 
learning is confined to proceeding through trial and error, and the leverage that 
might otherwise come from the application of modem science is denied. 
Imitation: Imitation is simply replication performed by a competitor. If self 
replication is difficult, imitation is likely to be even harder. In competitive markets, it 
is the ease of imitation that determines the sustainability of competitive advantage. 
Easy imitation implies the rapid dissipation of rents. 
Factors that make replication difficult also make imitation difficult. Thus, the 
more tacit the firm's productive knowledge, the harder it is to replicate by the firm 
itself or its competitors. When the tacit component is high, imitation may well be 
impossible, absent the hiring away of key individuals and the transfer of key 
organizational processes. 
However, another set of barriers impede imitation of certain capabilities in 
advanced industrial countries. This is the system of intellectual property rights, such 
as patents, trade secrets, and trademarks, and even trade dress.23 Intellectual 
22 Needless to say, there are many examples of firms replicating their capabilities inappropriately by 
applying extant routines to circumstances where they may not be applicable, e.g., Nestles transfer of 
developed country marketing methods for infant formula to the third world (Hartley, 1989). A key 
strategic need is for firms to screen capabilities for their applicability to new environments. 
23 Trade dress refers to the "look and feel" of a retail establishment, e.g. the distinctive marketing and 
presentation style of The Nature Company. 
property protection is of increasing importance in the United States, as since 1982 the 
legal system has adopted a more pro-patent posture. Similar trends are evident 
outside the United States. Besides the patent system, several other factors cause 
there to be a difference between replication costs and imitation costs. The 
observability of the technology or the organization is one such important factor. 
Whereas vistas into product technology can be obtained through strategies such as 
reverse engineering, this is not the case for process technology, as a firm need not 
expose its process technology to the outside in order to benefit from it.24 Firms with 
product technology, on the other hand, confront the unfortunate circumstances that 
they must expose what they have got in order to profit from the technology. Secrets 
are thus more protectable if there is no need to expose them in contexts where 
competitors can learn about them. 
One should not, however, overestimate the overall importance of intellectual 
property protection; yet it presents a formidable imitation barrier in certain particular 
contexts. Intellectual property protection is not uniform across products, processes, 
and technologies, and is best thought of as islands in a sea of open competition. If 
one is not able to place the fruits of one's investment, ingenuity, or creativity on one 
or more the islands, then one indeed is at sea. 
We use the term appropriability regimes to describe the ease of imitation. 
Appropriability is a function both of the ease of replication and the efficacy of 
intellectual property rights as a barrier to imitation. Appropriability is strong when a 
technology is both inherently difficult to replicate and the intellectual property 
system provides legal barriers to imitation. When it is inherently easy to repIicate 
24 An interesting but important exception to this can be found in second sourcing. In the 
microprocessor business, until the introduction of the 386 chip, Intel and most other merchant semi 
producers were encouraged by large customers like IBM to provide second sources, i.e., to license and 
share their proprietary process technology with competitors like AMD and NEC. The microprocessor 
developers did so to assure customers that they had sufficient manufacturing capability to meet 
demand at all times. 
and intellectual property protection is either unavailable or ineffectual, then 
appropriability is weak. Intermediate conditions also exist (see Figure I). 
11.4. Strategic Issues from a Dynamic Capabilities Perspective 
The dynamic capabilities approach views competition in Schumpeterian 
terms. This means, at one level, that firms compete on the basis of product design, 
product quality, process efficiency, and other attributes. However, in a 
Schumpeterian world, firms are constantly seeking to create "new combinations," 
and rivals are continuously attempting to improve their competences or to imitate 
the competence of their most qualified competitors. Rivalry to develop new 
competences or to improve existing ones is critical in a Schumpeterian world. Such 
processes drive creative destruction. Differences in firms' capabilities to improve 
their distinctive competences or to develop new distinctive domains of competence 
play a critical role in shaping long-term competitive outcomes. 
The strategic problem facing an innovating firm in a world of Schumpeterian 
competition is to decide upon and develop difficult to imitate processes and paths 
most likely to support valuable products and services. Thus, as argued by Dierickx 
and Cool (1989), choices about how much to spend (invest) on different possible 
areas are central to the firm's strategy. However, choices about domains of 
competence are influenced by past choices. At any given point in time, firms must 
follow a certain trajectory or path of competence development. This path not only 
defines what choices are open to the firm today, but it also puts bounds around what 
its repertoire is likely to be in the future. Thus, firms, at various points in time, make 
long-term, quasi-irreversible commitments to certain domains of competence. 
Deciding, under significant uncertainty about future states of the world, which long- 

term paths to commit to and when to change paths is the central strategic problem 
confronting the firm. 25 
111. CONCLUSION 
We posit that the competitive advantage of firms stems from dynamic 
capabilities rooted in high performance routines operating inside the firm, 
embedded in the firm's processes and conditioned by its history. Because of 
imperfect factor markets, or more precisely the non-tradability of "soft" assets like 
values, culture, and organizational experience, these capabilities generally cannot be 
bought; they must be built. This may take years - possibly decades. In some case, as 
when the competence is protected by patents, imitation by a competitor is illegal as a 
means to access the technology. The capabilities approach accordingly sees definite 
limits on strategic options, at least in the short run. Competitive success occurs in 
part because of processes and structures already established and experience obtained 
in earlier periods. 
The notion that competitive success arises from the continuous development, 
exploitation, and protection of firm-specific assets, while not the dominant view in 
industrial organization, nevertheless has a long tradition going back at least to 
Schumpeter. Schumpeter, in his Theorv of Economic Development (1934), saw 
economic development as consisting of a process where entrepreneurs dipped into a 
stream of technical opportunities ostensibly made for reasons independent of 
particular markets and brought those innovations to market. The successful 
innovator achieved a monopoly in a particular market through bringing to market 
something which was quite unique, only to have that monopoly successfully 
whittled away by the entry (swarming) of imitators. The dynamic capabilities 
25 In this regard, the work of Ghemawat (1991) is highly germane to the dynamic capabilities 
approach to strategy. 
approach is a descendant of the Schumpeterian. However, it emphasizes 
organizational processes inside the firm more than Schumpeter ever did; nor is it just 
a positive theory of industrial change. It can also offer prescription because of its 
firm-level orientation, and it looks inside firms to help explain market processes. 
Because it's hard to transform organizational processes, the dynamic 
capabilities approach sees value augmenting strategic change as being difficult and 
costly. Moreover, it can generally occur only incrementally. Because capabilities 
cannot easily be bought and must be built,26 opportunities for growth from 
diversification are thus likely to be limited, lying "close in" to the firm's existing lines 
of product (Rumelt, 1974; Teece et al., 1994). In attempting to explicate competitive 
advantage, the dynamic capabilities approach places emphasis on the firm's internal 
processes, assets and market positions, the path along which it has traveled, and the 
paths that lie ahead. The framework also explicitly takes into account replicability 
and imitatability. 
We offer dynamic capabilities as an emerging paradigm of the modern 
business firm. It is an eclectic paradigm drawing from multiple disciplines, and 
advancing with the help of industry studies in the U.S. and elsewhere. There are, of 
course, a wide variety of theories of the firm, each sometimes highlighting a different 
a ~ ~ e c t . 2 7  It appears that the dynamic capabilities approach is seeking attention by 
promising to explain matters such as the limits of diversification, the feasibility of 
"converting" firms from military to civilian purposes, the adaptability of some firms 
and the intransigence of others, etc. Perhaps a decade from now we will be able to 
assess whether the promise has been honored, and whether as a consequence the 
26 Robert Hayes (1985) has noted that American companies tend to favor "strategic leaps." while, in 
contrast, Japanese and German companies tend to favor incremental, but rapid, improvements. If this 
is correct, it seems to indicate the Japanese and German managers more fully recognize the validity of 
the dynamic capabilities framework than do their American counterparts. 
27 Thus transaction cost economics highlights boundaries, agency theory highlights incentives and 
control, and the production function highlights the role of fixed factors. 
fields of industrial organization and business strategy can help us solidly come to 
grips with the challenges of our times. 
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